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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
After settling with Ruetgers-Nease Chemical Company 
("Ruetgers"), the EPA issued a "unilateral administrative 
order," pursuant to S 106 of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. S 9606, requiring Occidental 
Chemical Corporation ("Occidental") to assist in the 
financing and implementation of remedial response actions 
at the Centre County Kepone Superfund site. The District 
Court granted Occidental's motion to dismiss, concluding 
that Ruetgers' commitment to clean up the site and 
reimburse the Superfund for past response costs precluded 
the EPA from obtaining any relief from Occidental. We will 
reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the 
case for further proceedings. 
 
I. 
 
This case arises from the EPA's efforts to compel 
potentially responsible parties ("PRPs") under CERCLA to 
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conduct a cleanup at the Centre County Kepone Superfund 
Site in State College, Pennsylvania. Two PRPs are relevant 
to this appeal: Ruetgers, the site owner, whom EPA alleges 
is liable under S 107(a)(1) of CERCLA, and Occidental, 
whom EPA alleges is liable under S 107(a)(3) for "arranging 
for the disposal" of hazardous substances at the site. 42 
U.S.C. S 9607(a)(1) and (3).1 Since 1958, Ruetgers and its 
predecessor, Nease Chemical Company ("Nease"), have 
owned the Centre County Kepone site and have 
manufactured a variety of chemicals there. During a period 
in 1973 and 1974, Occidental's predecessor, Hooker 
Chemical Company ("Hooker"), contracted with Nease for 
the manufacture of a pesticide. Under their agreement, 
Hooker provided Nease with the raw materials and the 
formula for manufacturing the pesticide and paid Nease to 
manufacture the product, which involved the generation 
and disposal of hazardous substances on the site. 
 
In 1983, the Centre County Kepone site was listed on the 
National Priorities List, and in 1988, EPA entered into an 
administrative order with Ruetgers, who agreed to perform 
a remedial investigation/feasibility study, which was 
completed in 1992. In 1995, after dividing the remediation 
into two "operable units," EPA signed a "record of decision," 
announcing the selected remedial action for thefirst 
operable unit ("OU-1").2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The "arranger" theory of liability wasfirst recognized in United States 
v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(where A accepts a hazardous substance that is owned by B, and 
incorporates it into a commercial product for B's benefit and at B's 
direction, and hazardous substances are disposed of in the process, B 
has "arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances" under 
S 107(a)(3)). We considered the viability of the Aceto theory in FMC Corp. 
v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc), 
but we neither accepted nor rejected it as a basis for liability. See id. 
at 
846 ("[t]he court is equally divided on this point"). The validity of the 
Aceto theory is not currently before us. 
 
2. "OU-1 consists of contaminated ground water, surface water, soils, 
and sediments on the Site, as well as soil/sediment sampling of the 15- 
acre former spray field area and riparian areas of nearby Spring Creek. 
OU-2 will address soils and sediments from the sprayfield, Spring 
Creek, and a second nearby creek." App. 12-13 (Complaint P 24). 
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Pursuant to S 122(e), 42 U.S.C. S 9622(e), EPA served 
both Ruetgers and Occidental with "special notice letters," 
which set forth EPA's basis for their liability and invited a 
good faith offer of settlement. Following receipt of the letter, 
Ruetgers began negotiating with EPA regarding the 
remedial work for OU-1. In 1996, EPA entered into a 
Consent Decree with Ruetgers in which Ruetgers agreed to 
perform the remedial work for OU-1 and to pay $293,895 in 
past response costs in settlement of its liability with respect 
to OU-1. 
 
EPA's efforts to negotiate with Occidental, however, were 
unsuccessful. When negotiations with Occidental failed, 
EPA, finding that the Centre County Kepone Site presented 
an imminent and substantial endangerment, issued a 
unilateral administrative order ("UAO"), pursuant to S 106 
of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. S 9606, requiring that Occidental 
jointly implement the OU-1 remedy with Ruetgers. 
Specifically, the Order stated that Occidental is subject "to 
the same terms and conditions set forth in the Ruetgers 
Consent Decree with respect to financing and implementing 
the response actions" at the Centre County Kepone site. 
App. 136. It further provided: 
 
       [Occidental's] obligations under this Order may be 
       fulfilled by jointly fulfilling with [Ruetgers] the 
       obligations under the . . . proposed Consent Decree, 
       Civil Action No. 4: CV-96-2128. To the extent that any 
       portion of the Work is undertaken by [Ruetgers], 
       [Occidental] is not excused from performing under the 
       present Order and is severally liable for all obligations 
       set forth herein and for ensuring that the Work be 
       completed in a manner consistent with the NCP, 
       CERCLA and all applicable federal, state and local 
       laws. 
 
App. 151. 
 
Under S 106(a), if EPA finds an "imminent and 
substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or 
the environment," it is authorized to "issue such orders as 
may be necessary to protect public health and welfare and 
the environment." 42 U.S.C. S 9606(a). If the ordered party 
fails to comply with the order "without sufficient cause," 
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CERCLA provides for severe penalties -- i.e., up to $25,000 
per day of noncompliance, see id. S 106(b)(1), plus treble 
damages, see id. S 9607(c)(3). CERCLA provides, however, 
that, if the ordered party is not liable, or demonstrates that 
the ordered action was arbitrary and capricious, it may 
obtain reimbursement of costs expended in compliance with 
the order, plus interest. See id. SS 9606(b)(2)(A)-(E). In 
addition, under S 106(b)(1), an ordered party may avoid the 
imposition of fines or penalties if it has "sufficient cause" 
for its refusal to comply with the order.3  
 
In this case, Occidental informed EPA it would not 
comply with the S 106 order, and EPA filed this action in 
District Court to enforce its order. EPA's Complaint seeks 
(1) an injunction ordering Occidental to comply with the 
order; (2) certain past costs not recovered from Ruetgers; (3) 
civil penalties; (4) punitive damages; and (5) a declaratory 
judgment of liability for future costs incurred at the site. 
 
Occidental moved to dismiss the Complaint under 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Occidental argued 
that EPA has already obtained "complete relief" from the 
Ruetgers Consent Decree and, therefore, is precluded from 
pursuing Occidental for the same relief. To find otherwise, 
Occidental argues, would permit EPA to obtain a double 
recovery, which is impermissible both under CERCLA and 
common law. The District Court agreed and dismissed 
EPA's Complaint. The District Court then denied a 
subsequent motion for partial reconsideration. EPA now 
appeals. We exercise plenary review of a grant of a motion 
to dismiss, accepting all allegations in the Complaint as 
true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff. See Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 
129 F.3d 310, 315 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
II. 
 
CERCLA provides a complex statutory scheme for the 
cleanup of the nation's hazardous waste sites. Although 
EPA has several alternative strategies for achieving the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The issue of whether Occidental has sufficient cause not to comply 
with EPA's UAO is not currently before us. 
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statute's objective, each ultimately involves "forc[ing] 
polluters to pay for costs associated with remedying their 
pollution." United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 
252, 257-58 (3d Cir. 1992). In FMC Corp. v. Dept. of 
Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 843 (3d Cir. 1994), this Court 
noted "CERCLA's broad remedial purposes" and cited as 
"most important[ ]" CERCLA's "essential purpose of making 
those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of 
chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for 
remedying the harmful conditions they created." 
 
To this end, CERCLA provides EPA with a variety of tools 
for achieving the efficient and cost-effective cleanup of the 
nation's hazardous waste sites. First, under S 104(a) EPA 
itself can conduct the remedial work at a site, using the 
Superfund, and then sue the potentially responsible parties 
under S 107 to recover its costs. EPA may sue one or all of 
the PRPs involved at a given site, as each PRP is jointly and 
severally liable for all response costs that are"not 
inconsistent with the national contingency plan." 42 U.S.C. 
S 9607(a)(4)(A). Second, under S 106(a), if EPA determines 
there is an "imminent and substantial endangerment to the 
public health or welfare," it may order PRPs to undertake 
the remedial work in the first instance, either by obtaining 
injunctive relief in a District Court or by issuing such 
administrative orders "as may be necessary to protect 
public health and welfare and the environment." 42 U.S.C. 
S 9606(a). 
 
Finally, S 122 of CERCLA expressly provides that 
"whenever practicable and in the public interest . . . [EPA] 
shall act to facilitate agreements . . . in order to expedite 
effective remedial actions and minimize litigation." 42 
U.S.C. S 9622(a). It is through S 122 that PRPs may agree, 
as opposed to being ordered under S 106(a), to do the 
remedial work at a site in the first instance. While EPA has 
the discretion to decide which PRPs to pursue for 
performance of the remedy or recovery of its past costs, and 
thus is authorized to pursue fewer than all PRPs at a given 
site, the statute expressly permits PRPs to sue other liable 
parties for contribution. See 42 U.S.C.S 9613(f)(1). 
 
Some settlements between PRPs and EPA, like the 
Ruetgers Consent Decree, involve agreements to do work, 
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while others are "cash out" settlements in which a party 
pays a portion of the past, or future, response costs in 
exchange for a release from liability. See id. SS 9622(g), (h). 
In either case, settlements with the United States under 
CERCLA typically include a covenant not to sue and 
contribution protection for matters addressed in the 
settlement. See id. SS 9622(f), (h)(4); 9613(f)(2). In exchange, 
the government typically retains "settlement re-openers" for 
remedy failure, unforeseen conditions, and other 
contingencies. 
 
III. 
 
Section 122 of CERCLA authorizes the EPA to enter into 
a settlement agreement requiring one or more PRPs to 
conduct a cleanup and goes on to provide that the 
agreement "shall be entered in the appropriate district 
court as a consent decree." 42 U.S.C. SS 9622(a), (d)(1)(A). 
Subsection (c)(2) of S 122 expressly provides that entering 
into such a settlement shall not preclude the EPA from 
taking action under S 106 against any PRP who is not a 
party to the settlement or from suing such a PRP under any 
provision of the Act: 
 
       If an agreement has been entered into under this 
       section, [EPA] may take any action under section 106 
       of this title against any person who is not a party to 
       the agreement, once the period for submitting a 
       proposal under subsection (e)(2)(B) of this section[i.e., 
       a 60-day negotiation period following the issuance 
       "special notice" letters which call for the PRPs' 
       submission of "good faith offers"] has expired. Nothing 
       in this section shall be construed to affect . . . 
 
       (B) The authority of [EPA] to maintain an ac tion 
       under this chapter against any person who is not a 
       party to the agreement. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 9622(c)(2).4 As we have noted, S 106 authorizes 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Subsection (c)(2)(A) provides that nothing inS 122 shall affect "the 
liability of any person under sections 106 and 107 .. . with respect to 
any costs or damages which are not included in the agreement." This 
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the EPA to enter administrative orders and to bring suits, 
like the instant one, to enforce such orders. Section 
122(c)(2)(B) would, thus, appear to provide express 
authority for the EPA's suit against Occidental. Occidental, 
however, would have us seize on a provision from 
CERCLA's contribution section as limiting the EPA's 
authority to sue non-settling PRPs under S 122(c)(2)(B). 
Section 113(f)(3)(A) provides: 
 
       If the United States or a State has obtained less than 
       complete relief from a person who has resolved its 
       liability to the United States or a State in an 
       administrative or judicially approved settlement, the 
       United States or the State may bring an action against 
       any person who has not so resolved its liability. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 9613(f)(3)(A) (emphasis added). 
 
Occidental argues that the Consent Decree affords EPA 
complete relief and, therefore, that EPA is barred from 
ordering Occidental to assist in the OU-1 remedy with 
respect to both past response costs and remedial work. The 
District Court agreed and held that allowing EPA to order 
Occidental to assist in paying for and performing the 
cleanup of OU-1 would give the EPA a double recovery in 
contravention of both CERCLA and the common law. 
 
The Government does not dispute that S 113(f)(3) permits 
it to pursue non-settlors only where the relief it has 
obtained in settlements with others is "less than complete." 
Indeed, the Government agrees that it is permitted"but one 
satisfaction" of a claim and that, once a claim is "satisfied," 
all other joint tortfeasors are released. The Government 
insists, however, that merely signing the Ruetgers Consent 
Decree, in which Ruetgers agreed to perform work in the 
future, does not constitute "satisfaction" of its claim and, 
thus, does not mean the Government has "obtained" 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
provision is not addressed specifically to the rights of non-settling 
parties. It is intended to "make clear" that S 122 does not affect the 
liability of settling or non-settling parties "for matters not covered by 
the 
agreement." H.R. Rep. No. 99-253(V), at 61 (1985), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3184. 
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complete relief. Quite the contrary, the Government argues 
that it has obtained complete relief only when "the 
endangerment providing the basis for EPA's S 106(a) 
authority has been abated." Brief for Appellant at 16. 
 
As a matter of textual analysis, it is possible to read 
S 113(f)(3)(A) in isolation as terminating the government's 
right to sue when it has secured a legally enforceable right 
to complete relief against one PRP. Nevertheless, we believe 
that the government's reading of that section is not only 
permissible from the standpoint of textual analysis,5 but 
also fits more comfortably in the statutory scheme and its 
common law background. Moreover, to the extent there is 
an ambiguity, we conclude that we are bound to defer to 
the EPA's reasonable understanding of the statute. 
 
IV. 
 
It seems to us not only that S 122 provides express 
authority for the actions the EPA has taken with respect to 
Occidental, but also that its principal purpose is to make 
sure the authority to issue administrative orders and 
enforce them is preserved in situations like this where a 
settlement agreement has been entered with another PRP.6 
 
Subsection 113(f)(3)(A) has a different purpose, one not 
directly related to the issue before us. Section 113(f) is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Contrary to Occidental's suggestion, the clause "in an administrative 
or judicially approved settlement" does not modify "complete relief." 
Rather, it modifies "a person who has resolved its liability." 
Accordingly, 
the text of S 113(f)(3)(A) does not expressly answer whether "complete 
relief " refers to a legally enforceable right to such relief or to a 
satisfaction of that right. 
 
6. We reject Occidental's suggestion that S 122(c)(2) authorizes only the 
issuance of administrative orders following a settlement with one PRP 
and not suits to enforce such orders. First, S 122(c)(2) incorporates 
without reservation "any action under section 106," and S 106(a) 
authorizes suits to enforce administrative orders. Second, S 122(c)(2)(B) 
expressly preserves the right of the government to sue other PRPs. 
Finally, we feel confident that Congress did not intend to authorize 
administrative orders against a person who was not a party to a 
settlement and, at the same time, deny the EPA the authority to enforce 
those orders in court. 
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entitled "Contribution." Subsection (1) of that section 
recognizes the right of PRPs who have settled or been found 
liable to seek contribution from other PRPs. Subsection (2) 
next stipulates the effect that a settlement between the EPA 
and a PRP will have on rights of contribution. It is in this 
context that one finds subsection (3), entitled "Persons not 
a party to settlement." The purpose of subsection (3)(A), 
which we have quoted above, is to make clear that the right 
of contribution possessed by a PRP, who has settled with 
the EPA, against other PRPs does not preclude the EPA 
from suing other PRPs. 
 
In this context, we think it highly unlikely that the initial 
clause of S 113(f)(3)(A), so heavily relied upon by Occidental 
-- "[i]f the United States or a State has obtained complete 
relief " -- was intended to limit the otherwise unqualified, 
express authority to sue non-settling PRPs conferred by 
SS 106 and 122(c)(2). It seems far more reasonable to read 
that clause as recognition of the obvious fact that if the 
cleanup has been fully accomplished and paid for, the 
government is entitled to no further relief.7 
 
This latter reading of the disputed clause is consistent 
with the prohibition against double recovery found in the 
common law. The Restatement of Judgments provides that 
a "judgment against one person liable for a loss does not 
terminate a claim that the injured party may have against 
another person who may be liable therefor." Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments S 49 (1982). The Commentary then 
explains that "[d]ouble recovery is foreclosed by the rule 
that only one satisfaction may be obtained for a loss that is 
the subject of two or more judgments." Id. S 49 cmt. a. 
Indeed, we recently affirmed that under Pennsylvania law, 
which follows the common law rule, "[t]he `one satisfaction' 
rule bars a subsequent suit against another tortfeasor only 
where the prior proceedings can reasonably be construed to 
have resulted in full satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim." 
Greenleaf v. Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d 352, 357 (3d Cir. 1999) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The legislative history identified by Occidental suggests to us no more 
than that Congress intended there to be no double recovery by the 
government, an intention that is satisfactorily accommodated by the 
EPA's reading of S 113(f)(3). 
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(quoting Frank v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 522 F.2d 321, 326 
(3d Cir. 1975)). EPA's argument that it has not obtained 
"complete relief " until the endangerment has been abated 
-- i.e., its claim has been fully "satisfied" -- is, thus, 
consistent not only with CERCLA's language and objectives 
but also with the common law. 
 
Support for the EPA's reading of S 113(f)(3)(A) can be 
found in other CERCLA provisions as well. Section 122(f)(3) 
provides that a covenant not to sue for liability as to future 
costs at a site shall not even take effect until EPA certifies 
"that the remedial action has been completed." 42 U.S.C. 
S 9622(f)(3). Similarly, S 122(f)(5) states that any covenant 
not to sue "shall be subject to satisfactory performance" by 
the settlor. If, as Occidental insists, S 113(f)(3)(A) terminated 
the EPA's authority to sue a PRP whenever it entered a 
settlement agreement with another PRP, the statute would 
favor non-settling parties by shielding them fromS 106 
actions prior to completion of the work and abatement of 
the endangerment while denying such protection to the 
settling party. 
 
Moreover, we believe the EPA's understanding makes 
sense as a practical matter. The existence of a settlement 
(often imposing on the settlor a multi-year, multi-million 
dollar obligation) does not guarantee that the settlor will 
successfully complete all the promised work. It would 
overlook this simple fact to suggest, as Occidental does 
here, that although all PRPs are jointly and severally liable 
for the cleanup, once a single PRP settles, EPA is foreclosed 
from pursuing any other PRP under S 106, despite its 
finding that a imminent and substantial endangerment 
exists. Occidental's proposed reading of S 113(f)(3)(A) would 
reward recalcitrant parties, thereby discouraging 
settlements. Cf. B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 527 
(2d Cir. 1996) (the "usual federal policy encouraging 
settlements is even stronger in the CERCLA context"); 42 
U.S.C. S 9622(a) ("whenever practicable and in the public 
interest . . . [EPA] shall act to facilitate agreements . . . in 
order to expedite effective remedial actions and minimize 
litigation"). By bringing more parties into the cleanup effort, 
EPA protects itself against the risk that any one party may 
become unable or unwilling to perform the remedy as EPA 
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instructs. Thus, by issuing administrative orders to non- 
settling PRPs under S 106, EPA fulfills CERCLA's objectives 
of promoting fairness at multi-party sites, increasing the 
likelihood of settlements, and accelerating the statute's 
ultimate goal -- site cleanup. 
 
Finally, we note that Occidental does not contest that 
EPA may enter separate consent decrees with multiple 
parties requiring joint implementation. Nor does it argue 
that the EPA may not issue separate Section 106 orders to 
multiple parties requiring joint implementation. Yet, 
Occidental has suggested no persuasive reason why 
Congress might have wished to authorize these strategies 
and, at the same time, deny the EPA authority to do what 
it did here -- propose to two PRPs that they jointly 
implement a cleanup, settle with the one that is willing to 
settle, and order the non-settling PRP to assist.8 
 
V. 
 
In the final paragraph of its opinion, the District Court 
adopted a related alternative ground for its ultimate 
conclusion, one based on S 106(a) rather thanS 113(f)(3)(A). 
Because the EPA, in its view, had received "complete relief " 
by entering the Ruetgers settlement, the District Court held 
that the S 106 order directed to Occidental was not 
"necessary to protect public health and welfare and the 
environment" as required by S 106(a). Reading S 106(a) as a 
whole,9 it seems clear that the question of whether an order 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Occidental does point out that it is in a different position than it 
would have been had two S 106 orders been entered. Under S 113(f)(2), 
a PRP that has settled is not "liable for claims for contribution 
regarding 
matters addressed in the settlement" and the amount paid by the 
settling party only "reduces the potential liability of the other[ ]" 
PRPs. As 
a result, Occidental posits that if it should wind up paying for "more 
than its fair share" of the costs of the cleanup, it would not be able to 
obtain contribution from Ruetgers. While this is true, it is the result of 
a deliberate policy choice made by Congress in order to encourage 
settlements. As explained in B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 527 
(2d Cir. 1996), the intended effect of S 113(f)(2) is that "non-settling 
defendants may bear disproportionate liability for their acts." 
 
9. Section 106(a) provides in its entirety: 
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may be necessary to protect public health, welfare, and the 
environment goes to the status of the contamination at the 
site, not to who is, or who is not, obligated to address it. 
See 42 U.S.C. S 9606(a) ("[the President] may require the 
Attorney General of the United States to secure such relief 
as may be necessary to abate such danger or threat"). 
Accordingly, we do not find a limitation on the unqualified, 
express authority conferred by S 122 latent in the 
"necessary" requirement of S 106(a). Here, the EPA's Order 
appropriately documented the presence of hazardous 
substances at the site and their likelihood of endangering 
public health, thereby satisfying the "necessity" 
requirement of S 106(a). 
 
VI. 
 
Even if we were not fully persuaded that this suit is 
authorized by S 122(c)(2), however, we would not be at 
liberty to reject the EPA's position. Section 113(f)(3)(A), at 
most, creates an ambiguity and, where ambiguity exists, we 
are constrained to defer to the interpretation of the agency 
that has been charged with administering the statute. We 
recently summarized the standard of review as follows: 
 
       When reviewing an agency's construction of a statute, 
       if the intent of Congress is clear, then we must give 
       effect to that intent. If the statute is silent or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       In addition to any other action taken by a State or local 
government, 
       when the President determines that there may be an imminent and 
       substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the 
       environment because of an actual or threatened release of a 
       hazardous substance from a facility, he may require the Attorney 
       General of the United States to secure such relief as may be 
       necessary to abate such danger or threat, and the district court of 
       the United States in the district in which the threat occurs shall 
       have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the public interest and 
the 
       equities of the case may require. The President may also, after 
       notice to the affected State, take other action under this section 
       including, but not limited to, issuing such orders as may be 
       necessary to protect public health and welfare and the environment. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 9606(a). 
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       ambiguous with respect to a specific issue, then a 
       deference standard applies, and the question for the 
       court becomes whether the agency's answer is based 
       on a reasonable construction of the statute. 
 
Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 177 F.3d 136, 143 
(3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Sekula v. FDIC, 39 F.3d 448, 451-52 
(3d Cir.1994)). 
 
The Supreme Court caselaw teaches that we must defer 
to agency interpretations that are supported by 
"regulations, rulings, or administrative practice." Bowen v. 
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988); see also 
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998) ("the well- 
reasoned views of the agencies implementing a statute 
`constitute a body of expertise and informed judgment to 
which courts . . . may properly resort for guidance") 
(quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 
(1944)); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997) 
(deferring to agency interpretation where there was"no 
reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect 
the agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter in 
question"). We, thus, must defer not only to those 
interpretations supported by notice-and-comment 
rulemaking but also to interpretations that find support in 
informal agency practice. In Cleary v. Waldman, 167 F.3d 
801, 808 (3d Cir. 1999), we articulated the rule governing 
deference to informal interpretations as follows: "[I]f an 
agency has been granted administrative authority by 
Congress for a statute, its interpretation -- despite arising 
in an informal context -- will be given deference as long as 
it is consistent with other agency pronouncements and 
furthers the purposes of the Act." 
 
As evidenced by the EPA's policy documents, it has long 
been its practice under S 106 to issue administrative orders 
to non-settling parties, even after a consent decree has 
been reached with another PRP for the performance of the 
remedial work at a site. In a 1996 Policy Memorandum, the 
EPA spoke as follows on the issue: 
 
       Regional staff are required to prepare appropriate 
       documentation for decisions not to issue UAOs to late- 
       identified PRPs -- i.e., PRPs who are identified after 
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       other PRPs assume the obligation to conduct the 
       response action. (Headquarters recently distributed 
       model UAO language requiring late-identified PRPs to 
       "participate and cooperate" with PRPs already 
       conducting the cleanup pursuant to either a settlement 
       agreement or an earlier UAO. It is similar to the 
       "coordinate and cooperate" language contained in 
       "parallel UAOs," . . . although those orders are for 
       already-identified PRPs who are recalcitrant and refuse 
       to joint other PRPs who are signing a consent decree.) 
 
EPA Memorandum, Documentation of Reason(s) for Not 
Issuing CERCLA S 106 UAOs to All Identified PRPs at 5 
(Aug. 2, 1996) (emphasis added); see also Walter E. 
Mugdan (EPA Deputy Regional Counsel), The Use of 
CERCLA Section 106 Administrative Orders to Secure 
Remedial Action, American Law Institute, C948 ALI-ABA 
113 (1994) ("settlements, . . . coupled with subsequent 
unilateral orders . . . against non-settlors, are ways for the 
government to create an environment in which 
volunteerism is promoted and a sense of fairness among 
the volunteers is enhanced").10 
 
EPA is clearly charged with administering CERCLA, and 
the policy memoranda quoted above indicate that its 
administrative practice is consistent with the interpretation 
it has proffered here. Therefore, following the rule 
announced in Cleary, we must defer to the EPA's 
interpretation of S 113(f)(3)(A), provided it is based on a 
reasonable construction of that provision and is consistent 
with the purposes of CERCLA. See Cleary, 167 F.3d at 806 
(deferring to agency's statutory construction as stated in 
policy memoranda). For the reasons set forth in the 
preceding section, we cannot characterize the EPA's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The policy discussed in this policy statement goes back at least to 
1990. See, e.g., EPA Memorandum, Guidance on CERCLA Section 106(a) 
Unilateral Administrative Orders (Mar. 7, 1990) (described in EPA 
Memorandum of August, 1996) ("When a complete settlement agreement 
is reached for conduct of the remedial action with fewer than all PRPs, 
the Agency may agree to issue `parallel' unilateral orders to the liable 
non-settlors. Parallel unilateral orders direct the non-settlors to 
coordinate and cooperate with the settlors' cleanup activities, as 
described in the consent decree."). 
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interpretation as unreasonable. It follows that the District 
Court's reading of the statute must be rejected.11 
 
VII. 
 
Applying the aforementioned legal precepts to the facts of 
this case, we conclude that the District Court erred in 
dismissing the EPA's Complaint. As far as the remedial 
work is concerned, Occidental concedes that, although 
Ruetgers has agreed to perform all of the work, it has not 
yet done so. Therefore, EPA has "obtained less than 
complete relief " and is expressly authorized by SS 106 and 
122 to issue an administrative order to Occidental, 
requiring that it jointly perform the necessary work. 
 
With respect to the past response costs, the result is the 
same. The District Court interpreted the Ruetgers Consent 
Decree as reimbursing the United States for all  past 
response costs. Since the Ruetgers' commitment included 
reimbursement of all of the EPA's past response cost, the 
Court reasoned that it had obtained "complete relief" and 
that any recovery of past response cost in this action would 
constitute an impermissible double recovery. If the EPA in 
fact incurred more past response costs than the 
$293,985.10 mentioned in the Decree, its remedy was to 
sue Ruetgers. 
 
Although we have reservations about the District Court's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Contrary to Occidental's suggestion, we are not deferring to the EPA's 
litigation position, but to policy memoranda consistent with that 
position. The EPA's "position is in no sense a`post hoc rationalizatio[n]' 
advanced by an agency seeking to defend past agency action against 
attack." Auer, 519 U.S. at 912 (quoting Bowen, 488 U.S. at 212) 
(deferring to agency's construction of a regulation even though that 
"interpretation comes to us in the form of a legal brief "); see also 
Molinary v. Powell Mountain Coal Co., 125 F.3d 231, 235 n.4 (4th Cir. 
1997) ("the fact that the Secretary's interpretation of the statutory 
language at issue comes to us in the form of a legal brief `does not, in 
the circumstances of this case, make it unworthy of deference' ") (quoting 
Auer). Because we see "no reason to suspect that the [EPA's] 
interpretation does not reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment 
on the matter in question," we will defer to its interpretation. Auer, 519 
U.S. at 462. 
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construction of the Consent Decree, we see no need to 
construe it here. Whether or not the Consent Decree was 
negotiated, as Occidental maintains, with the 
understanding that the EPA's past response cost totaled 
$293,985.10, any agreement on that score between the EPA 
and Ruetgers clearly does not operate to the benefit of 
Occidental. The complaint in this suit alleges that the EPA 
has incurred past response costs of $491,637, and we are 
required at this stage to credit that allegation. See Weiner 
v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 315 (3d Cir. 1997). If 
Occidental is shown to be a responsible party, it will be 
jointly and severally liable for those costs. Even assuming 
that it is entitled to a $293,985.10 credit for the past 
response costs previously paid by Ruetgers, Occidental will 
owe the balance.12 
 
VIII. 
 
In Count V of its Complaint, the EPA sought a 
declaratory judgment, "holding Occidental liable in future 
actions to recover further costs incurred at or in connection 
with the site." The District Court dismissed the entire 
Complaint without separately addressing this Count. The 
EPA argues here that the District Court "erred in 
dismissing Count V insofar as it requested a declaratory 
judgment for future costs not just as to the first operable 
unit, but as to the second operable unit." Brief for Appellant 
at 30 (emphasis added.) 
 
The District Court read the Complaint narrowly, explicitly 
noting that "the present action against Occidental only 
deals with Operable Unit One." Dist. Ct. op. at 4. The EPA 
did not seek to clarify this alleged error in its motion for 
reconsideration. Moreover, as Occidental argues, in Count 
V of the Complaint, the EPA cites to S 122(g)(2), which sets 
forth the statute of limitations for cost recovery actions 
under S 107 and explicitly requires a trial court to enter a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. While both sides agree that the EPA cannot receive a double 
recovery, the parties have not briefed whether this principle should be 
applied on the basis of discrete categories of response costs, the total 
cleanup costs, or in some other manner. We accordingly express no 
opinion on those issues. 
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declaratory judgment on liability for future response costs 
if liability is found for past response costs. Thus, it is 
understandable that the District Court, having erroneously 
concluded that Occidental had no liability for EPA's 
outstanding past costs associated with OU-1, dismissed the 
S 122(g)(2) claim for a declaratory judgment as to future 
costs associated with OU-1. 
 
The case will be remanded for a determination of 
Occidental's liability for future costs as to OU-1. With 
respect to the future costs associated with OU-2, we agree 
that the Complaint, read as a whole, did not give fair notice 
of a claim for future response costs associated with OU-2. 
The EPA points our attention to two statements made in its 
brief in opposition to Occidental's motion to dismiss, but 
those statements refer only to the scope of the Ruetgers 
Consent Decree, not the scope of the declaratory judgment 
claim against Occidental. There was simply nothing in the 
pleadings or the record in the District Court that served to 
alert the District Court to the claimed broader scope of 
Count V. We hold, therefore, that any claim with respect to 
OU-2 was not before the District Court and is not before us 
now.13 
 
IX. 
 
The judgment of the District Court will be reversed, and 
the case will be remanded to the District Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. To the extent the EPA wishes to include a count seeking future costs 
associated with OU-2, it is free to seek leave to amend its Complaint in 
the District Court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). 
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